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Software Dependability in the
Tandem GUARDIAN System
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Abstmct_Based on extensive field failure data for Tandem's
GUARDIAN operating system, this paper discusses evaluation of
the dependability of operational software. Software faults consid-
ered are major defects that result in processor failures and invoke
backup processes to take over. The paper categorizes the underly-
ing causes of software failures and evaluates the effectiveness of
the process pair technique in tolerating software faults. A model
to describe the impact of software faults on the reliability of an
overall system is proposed. The model is used to evaluate the sig-
nificance of key factors that determine software dependability
and to identify areas for imProvement.
An analysis of the data shows that about 77% of processor
failures that are initially considered due to software are con-
firmed as software problems. The analysis shows that the use of
process pairs to provide checkpointing and restart (originally
intended for tolerating hardware faults) allows the system to tol-
erate about 75% of reported software faults that result in proces-
sor failures. The loose coupling between processors, which results
in the backup execution (the processor state and the sequence of
events) being different from the original execution, is a major
reason for the measured software fault tolerance. Over two-thirds
(72%) of measured software failures are recurrences of previ-
onsly reported faults. Modeling, based on the data, shows that, in
addition to reducing the number of software faults, software de-
pendabifity can be enhanced by reducing the recurrence rate.
Index Terms--Measurement, fault categorization, software
fault tolerance, recurrence, software reliability, operational
phase, Tandem GUARDIAN System.
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS paper discusses evaluation of the dependability of op-
erational software based on measurements taken from the
Tandem GUARDIAN operating system. The Tandem
GUARDIAN system is a commercial fault-tolerant system
built for on-line transaction processing and decision support.
The GUARDIAN operating system is a message-based operat-
ing system that runs on a Tandem machine. Many studies have
sought to improve the software development environment by
using the failure data collected during the development phase
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[1], [2], [31. The dependability issues for operational software
are typically very different from those for software under de-
velopment, due to differences in the operational environment
and software maturity. Also, the dependability of operational
software needs to be investigated in the context of the overall
system.
A study of the dependability of operational software based
on real measurements requires, in addition to instrumentation
and data collection, an understanding of the system architec-
ture, hardware, and software. It also requires an understanding
of the development, service, and operational environments.
Typically, measurement-based studies attempt to answer sev-
eral questions: What are the key failure modes and their sig-
nificance, how well do specific fault-tolerance techniques
work, and what is a realistic behavior model for the software
and its associated parameters? This paper presents results
based on field failure data collected from the Tandem
GUARDIAN operating system. The data cover a period ex-
tending over four months. The issues addressed include soft-
ware fault categorization, an evaluation of the software fault
tolerance of process pairs (a key hardware fault-tolerance
technique used in Tandem systems), and evaluation of the im-
pact of software faults on the overall system.
The next section discusses related research. Section III in-
troduces the Tandem GUARDIAN system and the measure-
ments made. Section IV investigates the underlying causes
(faults) that resulted in the observed software failures and
categorizes the identified faults. The significance of failure
recurrence is also discussed. Section V evaluates the software
fault tolerance of process pairs. The reasons for achieving this
software fault tolerance are investigated. This evaluation is
important because, although process pairs are specific to Tan-
dem systems, they are an implementation of the general ap-
proach of checkpointing and restart. Section VI builds a model
that describes the impact of faults in the GUARDIAN operat-
ing system on the reliability of an overall Tandem system. A
sensitivity analysis is conducted to evaluate the significance of
the factors that determine software dependability and to iden-
tify areas for improvement. Section VII summarizes the major
conclusions of this study.
II. RELATED RESEARCH
Software errors in the development phase have been exten-
sively studied. Software error data collected from the DOS/VS
operating system during the testing phase were analyzed in [4].
A wide-ranging analysis of software error data collected dur-
ing the development phase was reported in [5]. An error
?
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analysis technique was used to evaluate software development
methodologies in [6]. Relationships between the frequency and
distribution of errors.during software development, mainte-
nance of the developed software, and a variety of environ-
mental factors were analyzed in [7]. The orthogonal defect
classification, the use of observed software defects to provide
feedback on the development process, was proposed in [8].
These studies mainly attempt to fine-tune the software devel-
opment environment based on error analysis.
Software reliability modeling has also been studied exten-
sively, and many models have been proposed [1], [2], [3]. For
the most part, these models attempt to estimate the reliability
of software by analyzing the failure history of software during
the development phase, verification efforts, and operational
profile.
Measurement-based analysis of operational software de-
pendability has also evolved over the past 15 years. An early
study proposed a workload-dependent probabilistic model for
predicting software errors based on measurements from a DEC
system [9]. The effect of workload on operating system reli-
ability was analyzed using the data collected from an IBM
3081 machine running VM/SP [10]. A Marker model to de-
scribe the software error and recovery process in a production
environment using error logs from the MVS operating system
was discussed in [1 I]. Software defects and their impact on
system availability were investigated using data from the IBM
MVS system in [12]. In [13], results from a census of Tandem
systems were presented. The data showed that soRware was
the major source (62%) of outages in the Tandem system. De-
pendability and fault tolerance of three operating systems---the
Tandem GUARDIAN system, the IBM MVS system, and the
VAX VMS system--were analyzed using error logs in [14].
Software failures have also been studied from the software
fault-tolerance perspective. Two major approaches for soft-
ware fault tolerance---recovery blocks and N-version pro-
grammingmwere proposed in [15], [16]. Dependability model-
ing and evaluation of these two approaches were discussed in
[17]. The effectiveness of recovery routines in the MVS op-
erating system was evaluated using measurements from an
IBM 3081 machine in [18]. Software fault tolerance in the
Tandem GUARDIAN operating system was discussed in [19],
[20]. Architectural issues for incorporating hardware and soft-
ware fault tolerance were discussed in [21], [22], [23].
III. TANDEM SYSTEM AND MEASUREMENTS
The Tandem GUARDIAN system is a message-based mul-
tiprocessor system built for on-line transaction processing and
decision support [20]. A Tandem GUARDIAN system consists
of two to 16 processors, dual interprocessor buses, dual-port
device controllers, input/output (I/(3) devices, multiple I/O
buses, and redundant power supplies (Fig. 1). The key soft-
ware components are processes and messages. With a separate
copy of the GUARDIAN operating system running on each
processor, these abstractions hide the physical boundaries be-
tween processors and systems and provide a uniform environ-
ment across a network of Tandem systems.
In the Tandem GUARDIAN system, a critical system func-
tion or user application is replicated on two processors as pri-
mary and backup processes, i.e., as a process pair. Normally,
only the primary process provides service. The primary sends
checkpoints to the backup, so that the backup can take over the
function when the primary fails. The GUARDIAN system
software halts the processor it runs on when it detects nonre-
coverable errors. Nonrecoverable errors are a subset of excep-
tions in privileged system processes. They are detected by the
operating system or explicit software checks made by privi-
leged system processes. The designer determines whether a
specific exception is nonrecoverable. The "I'm alive" message
protocol allows the other processors to detect the halt and to
take over the primaries that were .running on the halted proces-
sor. With multiple processors running process pairs, dual in-
terprocessor buses, dual-port device controllers, multiple I/O
buses, disk mirroring, and redundant power supplies, the sys-
tem can tolerate a single failure in a processor, bus, device
controller, disk, or power supply.
Dual lair Bus
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Fig. 1. Tandem GUARDIAN system architecture.
In this paper, a software fault is a defect in the measured
software system, and a software failure is a processor failure
due to software. The terms processor halt and processor fail-
ure are used interchangeably. Fig. 2 illustrates the software
failure and recovery process in the Tandem GUARDIAN sys-
tem. When a fault in the system software is exercised, an error
(a fast error) is generated. Depending on the processor state,
this error may disappear or cause additional errors before be-
ing detected. The impact of a detected error ranges from a mi-
nor cosmetic problem at the user/system interface to a database
corruption. A software failure occurs when the system soft-
ware detects nonrecoverable errors and asserts a processor
halt.
Once a software failure occurs, the system attempts to re-
cover using backup processes on other processors. If this re-
cover), is successful, the system can tolerate the software fault.
The time it takes for the system to detect a processor halt and
for the backup to attain the primary's pre failure state depend.,
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on several factors, such as the priority of the process, proces-
sor configuration, and workload. The recovery usually takes
about 10 seconds. If a job takeover is not successful or if a
backup process faces the same problem after a takeover, a
double processor halt occurs. Regardless of whether the recov-
ery is successful, the software fault is identified and a fix is
made. A single software fault can cause multiple sothvare fail-
ures at a single site or at multiple sites ("Recurrences" in
Fig. 2).
Ftt|_
Fig. 2. SoRware failure and recovery in the Tandem GUARDIANsystem.
The human-generated soRware failure reports used in this
study were extracted from the Tandem Product Report (TPR)
database, a component of the Tandem Product Reporting Sys-
tem (PRS). A TPR is used to report all problems, questions,
and requests for enhancements by users or Tandem employees
concerning any Tandem product. A TPK consists of a header
and a body. The header provides fixed fields for information
such as the date, problem type, urgency, user and system iden-
tifications, and a brief problem description. The body ofa TPR
is a textual description of all actions taken by Tandem analysts
in diagnosing the problem. If a TPR reports a set, ware failure,
the body also includes the log of the memory dump analyses
performed by Tandem analysts. The information in a TPR
clearly indicates whether the incident was a software failure,
whether the underlying fault was fixed, and whether the TPR
shared the underlying fault with other TPRs. Two-hundred
TPRs for the GUARDIAN operating system that cover a pe-
riod extending over four months in 1991 were used for this
study.
IV. FAULT CATEGORIZATION
Several studies have performed fault categorization based
on faults identified during the development phase [4], [5], [7].
SoRware fault profiles in operational software can be quite
different, due to differences in the operational environment
and soRware maturity. We studied the underlying causes of
200 TPRs that reported processor failures seemingly due to
faults in the Tandem system software [24].
Fig. 3 shows a breakdown of the TPRs into three categories
(SoRware "Cause Identified," Software "Cause Unidentified,"
and "Non-Software Problem"). Determining whether a failure
was caused by software faults is not straightforward, due partly
to system complexity and partly to close interactions between
the soRware and the hardware in the system. The only reliable
approach is to declare an incident to be a software problem
only after analysts have located a fault in the software, repro-
duced the incident, and designed and tested a soRw.are fix.
Software causes were identified "for 153 TPRs ("Cause
Identified"). If a TPR identified a fault in the soft'ware and
resulted in a software fix, the incident was counted as a soft-
ware problem, even if it was initially triggered by a non-
software cause (e.g., a hardware fault). In 26 TPRs ("Cause
Unidentified"), analysts believed that the underlying problems
were software faults, but they had not yet located the faults.
We use the term unidentified failures to refer to these cases.
The rest of the TPRs ("Non-SoRware Problem") were due
mainly to hardware faults (e.g., a failure in power supply) or
operational faults (e.g., incorrectly specifying hardware speci-
fications in a system table). Note that 76.5% of the TPRs that
were initially classified as sottware problems were confn'med
as soRware problems, 13% of them were probably set, ware
problems, and the rest (10.5%) were non-software problems.
The 179 TPRs ("Cause Identified" and "Cause Unidentified")
formed the basis of our analysis. Fig. 3 specifies which groups
of the TPRs were used to build the subsequent tables.
NowSoftwa_ Problem (10.5%)
/ _ _i_.ir_cv6_) ]
som,.u__ (89.5_)\ /
T_ n.V,Vt a_tX _
Fig. 3. Problem types.
Table I shows the fault categories we selected in conjunc-
tion with analysts. The table also shows the number of unique
faults and the number of TPRs associated with each category.
For example, the "Data fault" category contained 12 unique
faults, and these faults caused 21 TPRs. Note that a single fault
may recur and generate multiple TPRs, because many users
run the same sottware. The 153 TPRs whose software causes
were identified were due to 100 unique faults.
A software failure caused by a newly found fault is referred
to as a first occurrence; a software failure caused by a previ-
ously reported fault is referred to as a recurrence. Recurrences
exist for several reasons. First, designing and testing a fix of a.
problem can take a significant amount of time. In the mean-
time, recurrences can occur at the same site or at other sites.
Second, the installation of a fix sometimes requires a planned
outage, which may force users to postpone the installation and
thus cause recurrences. Third, a purported fix can fail. Finally
and probably most importantly, users who did not experience
problems due to a certain fault ot_en hesitate to install an
available fix for fear that doing so will cause new problems.
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TABLE I
SOFTWARE FAULT CATEGORIZATION
Fault Catego,ry
Incorrect computation
Datafault
Datadefinition fault
Missing operation:
Uninitializedpointers
Uninitializednonpeinter variables
Not updatingdamstructures on theoccurrence
of certainevents
Not telling otherprocesses aboutthe occur-
fence of certain events
Side effect of code updat¢
Unexpected situation:
Race/timing problem
Errors with no definederror-handlingproce-
dures
Incorrectparameters or invalidcalls from user
processes
Not providingroutinesto handle legitimatebut
rare operationalscenarios
Microcodedefect
Others (cause does not fit any of the aboveclass)
Unable to classify due to insufficient information
All
,,I #F,ultsI
3 3
12 21
3 7
20 27
(6) (7)
(4) (6)
(6) (9)
(4) (s)
4 5
29 46
04) (is)
(4) (s)
(3) (7)
(8) 03)
4 g
10 12
15 24
100 153
Most of the categories in Table I are self-explanatory.
"Incorrect computation" refers to anarithmetic overflow or the
use of an incorrect arithmetic function (e.g., use of a signed
arithmetic function instead of an unsigned one). "Data fault"
refers to the use of an incorrect constant or variable. "Data
definition fault" refers to a fault in declaring data or in defin-
ing a data structure. "Missing operation" refers to an omission
of lines of source code. "Side effect of code update" occurs
when not all dependencies between software modules were
considered when updating the software. "Unexpected situa-
tion" refers to cases in which software designers did not an-
ticipate a legitimate operational scenario, and the software did
not handle the situation correctly. In the 24 TPRs we were
"Unable to classify due to insufficient information," analysts
did not provide detailed information about the nature of the
underlying faults. "Missing operation" and "Unexpected situa-
tion" were the most common types of software faults in the
measured software system. Additional code inspection and
testing efforts can be used to identify such faults.
Out of the I00 sofb, vare faults observed during the meas-
ured time window, 57 faults were diagnosed before the time
window (i.e., were recurrences) and 43 were newly identified
during the time window (i.e., were fast oceurcences). In other
words, over two-thirds of the TPRs (72%; 110 out of 153)
reported recurrences. When one considers that a single TPR
may list a rapid succession of failures, which are likely to be
caused by the same fault, the actual percentage of recurrences
may be higher.
Recurrences are not unique to Tandem systems. Similar
cases have been reported in IBM [25] and AT&T systems
[26]. In environments where many users run (different versions
of) the same software, the number of identified faults is not the
only factor determining software dependability. Recurrences
can seriously degrade so t_ware dependability in the field. In
[25], a preventive software service policy that takes both the
number of recurrences and the service cost into account was
discussed. An approach for automatically diagnosing recur-
rences based on symptoms was proposed in [27]. The issue of
recurrence is discussed further in Section VI.
V. SOFTWARE FAULT TOLERANCE
DUE TO PROCESS PAIRS
In [13], [19], it was observe.d that process pairs allow the
Tandem GUARDIAN system to tolerate certain software
faults. That is, in many cases of processor halts due to software
faults, the backup of a failed primary can continue the execu-
tion. This observation is rather counterintuitive, because the
primary and backup run the same copy of the software. The
phenomenon is explained by the existence of subtle software
faults that are not exercised again on a restart of the failed
software. Usually, field software faults not identified during
the testing phase are subtle and require very specific condi-
tions to be triggered. Since the process pair technique was not
explicitly intended for tolerating software faults, study of field
data is essential for understanding this phenomenon and for
measuring its effectiveness.
This section investigates the user-perceived ability of the
Tandem system to tolerate faults in its system software [24].
The software faults considered here are major defects that re-
sult in processor failures. Although process pairs are specific
to Tandem systems, they are an implementation of the general
approach of checkpointing and restart. This evaluation is im-
portant because it suggests that these may be low-cost tech-
niques for achieving software fault tolerance in large, con-
tinually evolving software systems. Attempts were recently
made in [28], [29] to take advantage of the subtle nature of
some software faults to enhance software fault tolerance in
user applications.
A. Measure of Software Fault Tolerance
Table II shows the severity of the measured software fail-
ures. In this table, a single processor halt implies that the built-
in single-failure tolei'ance of the system masked the software
fault that caused the halt. All multiple processor halts were
grouped because, given the Tandem architecture, a double
processor halt can potentially cause additional processor halts.
For example, if the system loses a set of disks as a result of a
double processor halt and the set of disks contains files re:
quired by other processors, additional processor halts can oc-
cur. There was one case in which a software failure occurred in
the middle of a system reboot. Since each TPR reports just one
problem, sometimes two TPRs were generated as a result of a
multiple processor halt. There were five such cases. Thus, the
179 TPRs reported 174 software failures.
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TABLE II
SEVERITY OF SOF_ARE FAILURES
Severity
Single processorhalt
Multipleprocessor halt
Haltoccurring duringsystem reboot
Unableto classify
All
I # Failures
138
31
1
4
174
FurtherCharacterized in
Table HI
TableIV
In this evaluation, the term software fault tolerance (SFT)
refers to the system's ability to tolerate software faults. Quanti-
tatively, it is defined as
SFT = numberofsofb,varefailuresinwhichasingleproccssorishalted (1)
totalnumberofsoRwarefailures
SFT represents the user-perceived ability of the system to tol-
erate faults in its system software due to the use of process
pairs. Table II shows that process pairs provide a significant
level of soRware fault tolerance in the Tandem GUARDIAN
environment. The measure of software fault tolerance is esti-
mated to be 82% (.138 out of 169, excluding the five special
cases). I
B. Outages Due to Software
This evaluation first focused on the multiple processor halts.
For each multiple processor halt, we investigated the first two
processor halts to determine whether the second halt occurred
on the processor executing the backup of the failed primary
process. In these cases, we also investigated whether the two
processors halted because of the same software fault.
TABLE Ill
REASONS FOR MULTIPLE PROCESSOR HALTS
Reasons for Multiple Processor Halts
The second halt occurs on the processor executing the
backup of the failed primary.
The second halt occurs due to the same fault that halted
the primary.
The second halt occurs due to another fault during job
takeover.
Unableto classify.
The second haltis not related to processpairs.
Thesystem hangs.
Faulty parallelsoRwareexecutes.
There is a randomcoincidence of two independent
faults.
A single processor halt occurs,but system coldload is
necessaryforrecovery.
Unabletoclassify.
All
# Failures
24
(17)
(4)
O)
(1)
(l)
(1)
(1)
3
31
The level of software fault tolerance achieved with process
pairs is high, but not perfect: a single fault'in the system soft-
ware can manifest itself as a multiple processor halt, which the
i This measure is based on reported soRware failures. The issue of underre-
porting was discussed in [13]. The consensus among experienced Tandem
engineers is that about 80% of software failures are not reported as TPRs and
that most of them are single processor halts. If that assessment is true, then
the softwarefault tolerance may be as high as 96%.
system is not designed to tolerate. Table III shows that in 86%
of the multiple processor halts (24 out of 28, excluding
"Unable to classify" cases), the backup of the failed primary
process was unable to continue the execution. In 81% of these
halts (17 out of 2 I, excluding "Unable to classify" cases), the
backup failed because of the same fault that caused the failure
of the primary. In the remaining 19% of the halts, the proces-
sor executing the backup of the failed primary halted because
of another fault during job takeover. About half Of the multiple
processor halts resulted in system coldloads. (A system cold-
load is a situation in which all processors in a system are re-
loaded.) The data showed that, in most situations, the system
lost a set of disks that contained flies required by other proces-
sors as a result of the first two processor halts, and other proc-
essors also halted. This sequence is the major failure mode of
the system resulting from software faults.
C. Characterization of Software Fault Tolerance
The information in Table II raises the question of why the
Tandem system lost only one processor in 82% of soft-ware
failures and, as a result, tolerated the soRware faults that
caused these failures. We identified the reasons for software
fault tolerance (SFT) in all single processor halts (138 in-
stances; refer to Table II) and classified them into several
groups. Table IV shows that in 29% of single processor halts
(40 out of 138), the fault that caused a failure of a primary
process was not exercised again when the backup reexecuted
the same task after a takeover. These situations occurred be-
cause some software faults are exposed in a specific memory
state (e.g., running out of buffer), on the occurrence of a single
event or a sequence of asynchronous events during a vulner-
able time window (timing), by race conditions or concurrent
operations among multiple processes, or on the occurrence of a
hardware error.
TABLE IV
REASONS FOR SOFTWARE FAULT TOLERANCE
Reasons for Software Fault Tolerance
The backup reexecutes the failed task after takeover,
but the fault that caused a failure oftbe primary is not
exercised by the backup.
Memorystate
Timing
Race orconcurrency
Hardwareerror
Others
Fraction (%)
29
(4)
(7)
(6)
(4)
(7)
The backup, aRer takeover, does not automatically
reexecote the failed task.
It is the effect of error latency.
A fault stops a processor runninl[ a backup.
The cause of a problem is unidentified.
Unable to classify.
2O
16
19
12
Fig. 4 shows a real example of a fault that is exercised in a
specific memory state. The primary of an I/O process pair,
which is represented by SlOP(P) in the figure, requested a
buffer to serve a user request. Because of the high activity in
the processor executing the primary, the buffer was not avail-
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able. However, because of a software fault, the buffer man-
agement routine returned a "successful" flag, instead of an
"unsuccessful" flag. The primary used the returned, uninitial-
ized buffer pointer, and a halt occurred in the processor run-
ning the primary because of an illegal address reference by a
privileged process. Clearly, such a situation was not tested
during the development phase. Since a memory dump is usu-
ally taken only from a halted processor in a production system,
a memory dump of the processor running the backup was not
available. Our best guess is that the backup process served the
request again after takeover but did not have a problem, be-
cause a buffer was available on the processor running the
backup.
C_A QDUB
SlOt_B) Buffa
Fig. 4. Differences between the primary and backup executions.
Table IV also shows that, in 20% of single processor halts
(28 out of 138), the backup of a failed primary process did not
have to serve the failed request after a successful takeover.
This happened because some faults are exposed while serving
requests that are important but are not automatically resubmit-
ted to the backup upon a failure of the primary. Fig. 5 illus-
trates an example of such a situation. In the figure, process PK
is an execution of a utility to monitor processor activity for
memory usage, message information, and paging activity.
Process PK does not run as a process pair because, if the proc-
essor being monitored halts while executing PK, there is no
need to monitor the halted processor any longer. Process MS
collects resource usage data, and process TM is in charge of
concurrency control and failure recovery. Both MS and TM
run as process pairs.
When the operator ran PK with a certain option that is not
frequently used, PK used an incorrect constant to initialize its
data structure. As a result, it overwrote (cleared) the page ad-
dresses of the first segment in the segment page table. The fu'st
segment is always owned by MS, and MS was running on the
processor. When MS stored resource usage data, it used incor-
rect addresses (addresses of zero) and corrupted the system
global data. A processor halt occurred as a result of an address
violation when TM accessed and used the address of a system
data table. When the backups of the failed primaries took over,
they did not have problems, because PK was running only on
the halted processor.
Another example is the faults that cause processor failures
during the execution of the operator requests for reconfiguring
I/O units. An I/O unit is a device or program by which an end-
user (a terminal operator, an application program, or an I/0
mechanism) gains access to the system. Utilities to perform
these reeonfigurations run as process pairs, but the operator
command to add, activate, or abort an I/O unit is not automati-
cally resubmitted to the backup, because it is an interactive
task that can easily be resubmitted by the operator if the pri-
mary fails. Suppose that an operator's request to add an I/O
unit caused a failure of the primary. In this situation, the opera-
tor would typically recover the halted processor, rather than
submit the same request to the backup. If the operator wants to
repeat the same request, he or she would normally repeat it on
the primary after the halted processor is reloaded. If the opera-
tor submits the request to the backup instantly upon a failure of
the primary, one of two situations can be expected: the backup
also fails, or the backup serves the request without any prob-
lem due to the factors in Table IV.
In the above examples, the task (i.e., process PK or a com-
mand to add an I/O unit) does not survive the failure. But
process pairs allow the other applications on the halted proces-
sor to continue to run. This situation is not strictly SFT but a
side benefit of using process pairs. If these failures are ex-
cluded, the estimated measure of SFT is adjusted to 78% (110
out of 141).
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Fig. 5. Faul_¢xposedbynon-proeess pain.
Another reason for the SFT is that some software faults
cause errors that are detected after the task that caused the
errors finishes successfully (effect of error latency). Fig. 6
shows an example. The figure shows a data transfer between
two primary I/O processes: SIOP(P) and XIOP(P). The under-
lying software fault was an extra line in the SlOP soRware that
caused SlOP(P) to transfer one more byte than was necessary.
This fault did not always cause a problem, because the size of
a buffer is usually bigger than the size of a message. When a
message and a buffer had equal sizes, the first byte in the end
tag of the buffer was overwritten. This corruption did not af-
fect the data transfer, because tags are not a part of data area
(The tags are used to check the integrity of a data structure, bu'
for performance reasons, they are not checked after every dat_
transfer.) The data transfer was successfully completed ant
cheekpointed to the backup. The corrupted buffer tag was no
a part of the checkpoint information. The corruption in the en(
tag was found later, when SIOP(P) returned the buffer to tht
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buffer manager. The buffer manager checked the integrity of
the begin and end tags, found a corruption, and asserted a halt
of the processor it runs on ("CPU A" in Fig. 6). The backups
of the failed primaries would take over, but they would not
have problems because the data transfer that caused the error
was already completed successfully. The difference between
this case and the first group of cases listed in Table IV is that
the task that caused the failure of the primary did not have to
be executed again in the backup.
CPUA
SlO_)
Dtta Tnu_
Fig. 6. Effect of error latency.
Table IV also shows that 16% of single processor halts (22
out of 138) were failures of backup processes. This result indi-
cates that the SFT did not come without a cost; the added
complexity due to the implementation of process pairs intro-
duced software faults into the system software. The estimated
measure of SFT (78%) can be adjusted again to 74% (88 out
of 119) when these failures are excluded. All unidentified fail-
ures were single processor halts. This is understandable, be-
cause these failures were caused by subtle faults that are diffi-
cult to observe and diagnose. The reason that an unidentified
failure caused a single processor halt is unknown. Based on
their symptoms, we speculate that a significant number of uni-
dentified failures were single processor halts because of the
effect of error latency.
D. Discussion
The results in this section have several implications. First,
the results show that hardware fault tolerance buys SFT. The
use of process pairs in Tandem systems, which was originally
intended for tolerating hardware faults, allows the system to
tolerate about 75% of reported field faults in the system sot_-
ware that cause processor failures. Subtle faults exist in all
software, but SFT is not achieved if the backup execution is a
replication of the original execution. The loose coupling be-
tween processors, which results in the backup execution (the
processor state and the sequence of events occurring) being
different from the original execution, is a major reason for the
measured SFT. Each processor in a Tandem system has an
independent processing environment; therefore, the system
naturally provides such differences. (The advantages of using
checkpointing, as compared with lock-step operation, in tel-
crating software faults were discussed in [19].) The level of
SFT achieved by the use of process pairs will depend on the
proportion of subtle faults in software. While process pairs
may not provide perfect SFT, the implementation of process
pairs is not as prohibitively expensive as is developing and
maintaining multiple versions of large software programs.
Second, the results indicate that process pairs can some-
times allow the system to avoid multiple processor halts due to
software faults, regardless of the nature of the faults, because
sottware failures can occur while the system executes impor-
tant tasks that are not automatically resubmitted to the backup
on a failure of the primary. In such a case, the failed task does
not survive, but the other applications on the failed processor
do.
Third, short error latency with error confinement within a
transaction is desirable [30]. In actual designs, such a strict
error confinement might be rather difficult to achieve. Errors
generated during the execution of a transaction may be de-
tected during the execution of another transaction. Interest-
ingly, long error latency and error propagation across transac-
tions sometimes help the system to tolerate software faults.
This result should not be interpreted to suggest that long error
latency or error propagation across transactions is a desirable
characteristic. It is a side effect of the system having subtle
soRware faults. Long error latency and error propagation
across transactions can make both on-line recovery and off-
line diagnosis difficult.
Finally, an interesting question is: If process pairs are good,
are process triples better? Our results show that process triples
may not necessarily be better, because the faults that cause
double processor halts with process pairs may cause triple
processor halts with process triples.
E. First Occurrences vs. Recurrences
Table V compares the severity of the three types of software
failures using the 174 software failures discussed in this sec-
tion. There were two special cases ("Others") in the table: a
multiple processor halt due to a parallel execution of faulty
code (a system coldload was not required) and a software fail-
ure during a system reboot. With only a single observation in
each case, the significance of these situations was unclear, and
they were not considered in the subsequent analysis. "Severity
Unclear" cases were also not considered further.
TABLE V
SEVERITY OF SOFTWARE FAILURES BY FAILURE TYPE
]#Failure #Double #System [ #Severity [ #OthersInstances CPU Halts Coldloads Unclear
First 41 9 6 1 1
occurrence
Recurrence 107 19 12 3 1
Unidentified 26 0 0 0 0
TableV indicates that a recurrence is slightly less likely than
a first occurrence to cause a double processor halt. The bino-
mial test was used to test this observation, because it does not
require an assumption about the underlying distribution to
construct a confidence interval [31 ]. Each failure was treated
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as a random trial with the probability of a double processor
halt being 0.23 (nine out of 39,'following the statistics for the
first occurrence). The hypothesis that the probability of a re-
currence causing a double processor halt is equal to that of a
first occurrence causing a double processor halt was tested by
calculating the probability of having 19 or fewer double proc-
essor halts out of I03 trials. The p-value was 0.16; that is, the
hypothesis was rejected at the 20% significance level.
Two of the six system coldloads due to first occurrences
were single processor halt situations. These two failures cap-
ture the secondary failure mode of the system due to sottware,
wherein a system is coldloaded to recover from a severe, sin-
gle processor halt.
VI. RELIABILITY MODELING
OF OPERATIONAL SO--ARE
Software reliability models attempt to estimate the reliabil-
ity of software. Many models have been proposed [1], [2], [3].
These models typically attempt to relate the history of fault
identification during the development phase, verification ef-
forts, and operational profile. The primary focus is on the
software development phase, and the underlying assumptions
are that software is an independent entity and that each soft-
ware fault has the same impact.
The results from the previous sections indicated that other
factors significantly impact the dependability of operational
software. First, software faults can be highly visible or less
visible. A single, highly visible software fault can cause many
field failures, and recurrences can seriously degrade software
dependability in the field. Second, for a class of software such
as the GUARDIAN operating system, the fault tolerance of the
overall system can significantly improve sottware dependabil-
ity by making the effects of software faults invisible to users.
Clearly, dependability issues for operational software in gen-
eral can be quite different from those for the software in the
development phase. Discussion of software reliability in the
system context was provided in [32]. An approximate model to
account for failures due to design faults was used to evaluate
the dependability of operational software in [33]. The use of
information on system usage (i.e., installation trail) to predict
software reliability and to determine test strategy was dis-
cussed in [34].
This section asks the question: Which factors determine the
dependability of the measured operating system? Using the
software failure and recovery characteristics identified in the
previous sections, this section builds a model to describe the
impact of faults in the GUARDIAN operating system on the
reliability of an overall Tandem system. Based on the model,
the section conducts a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the sig-
nificance of the factors considered and to identify areas for
improvement.
A. Model Construction
We considered a hypothetical eight-processor Tandem sys-
tem whose software reliability characteristics are described by
the parameters in Table VI. In this analysis, the term software
reliability means the reliability of an overall system whtn only
the faults in the system software that cause processor failures
are considered. A system failure was defined to occur when
more than half the processors in the system failed. All parame-
ters in the table except _, and g were estimated based on the
measured data (Sections IV and V). The values of _ and #
were determined to mimic the 30 years of software mean time
between failure (MTBF) and the mean time to repair (MTTR)
characteristics reported in [13]. Thus, the objectives of the
analysis were to model and evaluate reliability sensitivity to
various factors, not to estimate the absolute software
reliability.
TABLE VI
ESTIMATED SOFTWARE RELIABILITY PARAMETEIL$
Failures:
First Recurrence Unidentified
Occurrence
Failure rate _/= 0.24 ;t _ =0.61 _, _ =0.15 ;t
Prob(double CPU C,¢= 0.23 Ca, =0.18 Ca_ =0.0
haltlsoRware failure)
Prob(system failure[ Ca/= 0.44 C_a, -- 0.63 C._ = 0.0
double CPU halt)
Prob(system failurel C,,/= 0.05 C,,, = 0.0 C_ = 0.0
single CPU halt)
Failures:
SoRware failure rate = X = 0.32/year
Recovery:
Recovery _te ffi/a = 3/hour
In Table VI, "Prob(double CPU haltlsot_are failure)" is the
probability that a double processor halt (i.e., a failure of a
process pair) occurs given that a software failure occurs.
Similarly, "Prob(system failure[double CPU halt)" is the prob-
ability that a system failure occurs given that a double proces-
sor halt occurs. These two parameters were used to describe
the major failure mode of the system because of software. The
parameter "Prob(system failure[single CPU halt)" represents
the secondary failure mode, which captures single processor
halts severe enough to cause system coldloads. The table
shows these probabilities for first occurrences, recurrences,
and unidentified failures.
Based on the parameters in Table VI and on the following
assumption, we built a continuous-time Markov model to de-
scribe the software failure and recovery in a hypothetical
eight-processor Tandem system in the field.
ASSUMPTION I. The time between software failures in the sys-
tem has an exponential distribution, and the three types oy
failures (first occurrence, recurrence, and unidentified) art
randomly mixed
This assumption was necessary, because determining tht
above characteristics for a single system would require ;
minimum of a few hundred years of measurements. The as
sumption could not be validated using the measured data, be
cause the measured data was collected from a large number c
user systems running different versions of the operating syster
and having different operational environments and syster
configurations. Given this situation, the assumption seeme
reasonable.
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Fig. 7 shows the.Markov model. In the model, Sj, i = 0 .... 4
represents that i processors are halted because of soRware
faults. A system failure is represented by the Saow, state. To
evaluate soRware reliability, no recovery from a system failure
was assumed. That is, the system failure state is an absorption
state. The RI state represents an intermediate state in which the
system tries to recover from an additional software failure (/th
processor halt) using process pairs.
/
Fig. 7. SoRwarc reliability model.
If a software failure occurs during the normal system opera-
tion (i.e., when the system is in the So state), the system enters
the Rt state. If the failure is severe enough to cause a system
coldload, a system failure occurs; otherwise, the system at-
tempts to recover from the failure by using backups. If recov-
ery is successful, the system enters the St state; otherwise, a
double processor halt occurs. If the two halted processors
control key system resources (such as a set of disks) that are
essential for system operation, the rest of the processors in the
system also halt and a system failure occurs; otherwise, the
system enters the Sz state and continues to operate. The value
of r, the transition rate out of an Ri, is small and has virtually
no impact on software reliability; a value of one transition per
minute was used in the analysis. Since the system stays in an R_
state for a short time, additional failures occurring in an R_
state were ignored; in fact, these failures were implied in the
failure rate (2) in the corresponding Sj and Se, t states. Given
the model in Fig. 7, soRware reliability of the system can be
estimated by calculating the distribution of time for the system
to be absorbed to the Sao_, state, starting from the So state.
In Fig. 7, the three coverage parameters Cd, C,a, and C=
were calculated from Table Vh
Cd = Prob.(doubleCPU haltlsoftwarefailure)
2 fCd/ + ArCdr+ AuCdu (2)
Af+Ar+A u
Csd = Prob.(system failureldouble CPU halt)
A C C +A C C +A C C
= f df sdf r dr sdr u du sdu (3)
/%fCdf+XrCdr +/q,uCdu '
and
Css = Prob.(system failurelsingleCPU halt)
-. 2 fCss f + ArCss r + Au Cssu (4)
Xf + _'r + Au
The parameter Ca includes the two cases explained in Sec-
tion V: the failure of a process pair caused by a single soRware
fault and the failure of a process pair caused by two software
faults (the second halt occurs during job takeover). The pa-
rameter C,d represents the probability thatthe system loses key
system resources as a result of a double processor halt. The
parameter C•a is determined primarily by the system configu-
ration and is discussed further in Section VI.D. The above
three parameters can actually be obtained directly from Table
V in Section V.E. Equations (2), (3), and (4) will be used to
investigate the impact of recurrences (2) on soRware reliabil-
ity in Section VI.B.
The model (Fig. 7) includes the effect of multiple independ-
ent software failures. For example, if a software failure occurs
when the system is in the S_ state (i _ 0), the following three
system failure scenarios must be considered (Fig. 8):
1) The system fails regardless of whether the new failure
causes a single or double processor halt. This is because
when the first processor halts because of the new failure,
key system resources (such as a set of disks) become in-
accessible.
2) The system fails because the new failure is severe and
can only be recovered by a system coldload.
3) The new soRware failure causes a double processor halt,
and the second processor halt causes a set of disks to be-
come inaccessible.
I Ancw softw_ faiha'c_iatelyrmflt_ key re.sourc_minar._'cc_iblc?
IThe _w failureism=vcx_ *ad earnotalybc t"_ow:red by • syst_n eoldlo_17
System Fail_c
Sys_'m F_Itre
©
The new mttwa_s fmihm._ _ No
• Syslem in Stale Si+ 1
• double CPU hilt'/
TI_ _kJitlomtl _cm_i CPU ludt No G
-_ Sys_ra m Sine _÷2
makes key _ in_ible?
, ®
' System Failua'_
Fig. 8. Effect of multiple independent software failures.
It was not possible to directly measure the branching prob-
abilities in Fig. 8 for each state from the data, because the
major failure mode (i.e., a software failure occurred when the
system is in the So state, causing a double processor halt and
subsequently causing a system failure) was dominant. These
probabilities were estimated using the three measured parame-
ters: Ca, C,a, and C_,. Table VII shows the branching prob-
abilities in Fig. 8 estimated for each S, (i ¢ 0) state. For exam-
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TABLE VII
PARAMETERS FOR MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT SOFTWARE FAILURES
] i = 1 (i.e., system in $1)
PathA C._#
PathB (I C_#)Cu
PathC (I C._)(I Cu)(l Ca)
PathD (l C_#)(I Cu)C#(I C._)2
PathE (I C,#)(I C_)C¢(I (I C_t)2)
1=2 i=3 i=4
I (I Csl) 2' I (I C_) 3 ...... l
(I C_)2C_, (I C,#)3C= -
(I C_)2(I C_)(l Ca) (I C_)3(I C._)(l Ca) -
(I C_)2(I C_)Ca(l C_d)3 -
(I C_)2(I C,,)Cd(l (I C,_)3) (l C,#)3(l C,,)C#
pie, given that an additional soRware failure causes a double
processor halt when the system is in the S_ state, the probabil-
it), that the third processor halt does not cause a system failure
(path D in Fig. 8) is (1 C,d) 2. This is because the probability
that the third processor halted and either of the two processors
that were already halted control key system resources (i.e.,
cause a system failure) is Csa. The branching probabilities in
Table VII were used to determine the corresponding transition
rates in the model (Fig. 7).
The same recovery rate was used regardless of the number
of processors halted. This was because the recovery time is
typically determined by the time required to perform a quick
diagnosis and take a memory dump, which is done for one
processor at a time. Previous studies assumed that the failure
rate is proportional to the number of processors up and work-
ing [35]. The same software failure rate was assumed in all
states, considering that, as more processors halt, the remaining
processors will receive more su'ess. Again, the dominance of
the major system failure mode did not allow us to estimate the
parameters from the data.
The distribution of time for the system to be absorbed to the
system failure state, starting from the normal state, was evalu-
ated using the model in Fig. 7. SHARPE [36] was used for the
evaluation. Fig. 9 shows the software reliability curve of the
modeled system and confirms the assumed software MTBF of
30 years.The figure representsthe reliability of an overall
Tandem system inthefieldwhen onlythe faultsinthe system
softwarethatcausedprocessorfailureswere considered.
Reliability
1
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Fig. 9. System reliability due to software.
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B. Reliability Sensitivity Analysis
Table VIII shows the six factors considered in the analysis.
The second column of the table shows activities related to
these factors, and the third column shows the model parame-
ters affected by the factors. For example, a 10% reduction in
the recurrence rate (g,), which can be achieved by improving
the software service environment, will reduce 3. by 6.1%
(Table VI) and change Ca, Cse, and Cs, accordingly. Refer to
Equations (2), (3), and (4).
The coverage parameters Ca and C,a are determined primar-
ily by the robustness of process pairs and the system configu-
ration, respectively. For example, Ca can be reduced by con-
duct/ng extra testing of the routines related to job takeover.
The parameter C_a is determined by the location of failed proc-
ess pairs and the disk subsystem configuration. This parameter
is discussed further in Section VI.D. Analytical models for
predicting coverage in a fault-tolerant system and the sensitiv-
ity of system reliability/availability to the coverage parameter
were discussed in [37]. The recovery rate/.t can be improved
by automating the data collection and reintegration process.
TABLE VIII
FACTORS OF SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
Factor
S'oflwam fa/lum rate
Recurrence rate
Coverage parameter C#
Coverage parameter Cu
Coverage parameter.C,,,
Recovery t/me
.[[ Activity
Software development
Software service
Robusmcss of process
)a/re
System configuration
Diagnosability/
maintainability
Related Parameters
Detailed ] Overall
Ca/,Ca,,C_
C,_ C,#r, Cs_u
C,,/, C,,,, C,_
/a
Csd
c,,
g
Fig. 10 shows the software MTBF evaluated using the
model in Fig. 7 while varying the six factors in Table VIII, one
at a time. It is interesting to see that Ca and C_a are almost as
important as 2 in determining the software MTBF. For exam-
ple, a 20% reduction in Ca or Csa has as much impact on soft-
ware MTBF as an 18% reduction in 3.. (The figure shows that
the impact is approximately a 20% increase in software
MTBF.) This result is understandable because the system fails
primarily because of a double processor halt causing a set of
disks to become inaccessible, not because of multiple inde-
pendent software failures.
Fig. 10 also shows that the recurrence rate has a significant
impact on software reliability. A complete elimination of re-
currences (2, = 0 in Table VI) would increase the software
MTBF by a factor of three. The impact of C_ on soRware reli-
ability is small, because severe, single processor halts causing
system coldloads are rare. The impact of# on soRware MTBF
is virtually nil. In other words, recovery rate is not a factor as
far as software reliability is concerned, again, because the
system is unlikely to fail because of multiple independent
soRware failures.
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Fig. 10. SoRwareMTBFsensitivity.
Typically, it is assumed that the number of faults in software
is the only major factor determining software reliability.
Fig. 10 clearly shows that in the Tandem system, there are four
degrees of freedom in improving the sott'ware reliability: the
number of faults in software, the recurrence rate, the robust-
ness of process pairs, and the system configuration strategy.
The first two are general factors, and the last two are platform-
dependent factors. Efforts to improve software reliability can
be optimized by estimating the cost of improving each of these
four factors.
C. Reliability Sensitivity to Fault Category
This section investigates the impact of software faults in dif-
ferent fault categories (Table I in Section IV) on sottware reli-
ability. In this section, a failure group is deemed as the group
of software failures caused by all faults that belong to a fault
category. We estimated the sottware MTBF by assuming that
each failure group is empty, i.e., the faults in a fault category
did not cause software failures. The failure rate and the cover-
age parameters for the model in Fig. 7 were adjusted:
2=
(5)
total no. ofsottware failures- no. of software failures in a failure group ;t,
total no.ofsoRware failures
total no. of double CPU halts- no. o f double CPU halts in a failure group (6)
total no. ofsottware failures- no. ofsoRware failures in a failure group
C_d= (7)
total no. of system failures - no. of system failures in a failure group
total no. of double CPU halts - no. of double CPU halts in a failure group'
and
c,,=
total no. of severe, single CPU halts - no. of severe, single CPU halts in a failure group
(8)
total no. of software failures - no. of software failures in • failure group
In Equation (7), only those system failures caused by double
3rocessor halts (i.e., failures of process pairs) were counted.
Table IX shows the results. The last column of the table
_hows the improvement in software MTBF when failures
=aused by each fault category were eliminated. Only those
:ategories that have more than 10 failures were considered.
['he table shows that "Missing operation" caused the greatest
eliability loss. Further analysis showed that uninitialized
3ointers (Table I in Section IV) were responsible for more
han half of the loss caused by this group of failures. The table
also shows that "Unexpected situation" was another significant
source of reliability loss. Most of this loss is attributed to faults
such as incorrect parameters passed by user processes, illegal
procedure calls made by user processes, and not considering
all legitimate operational scenarios in designing software. (The
reliability loss is not attributed to subtle faults, such as race
conditions and timing problems.) Additional code inspection
and testing efforts can be directed to these fault categories.
Unidentified failures had virtually no impact on software reli-
ability, because all of these failures caused single processor
halts.
TABLEIX
RELIABILITY SENSITIVITY TO FAULT CATEGORY
Fault Category
Incorrect computation
Data fault
Data definition fault
Missing operation
Side effect of code update
Unexpected situation
Microcode defect
Others
Unidentified
Unable to classify
#Failures
3
21
7
27
5
46
8
12
26
24
1.00
1.47
1.35
1.06
1.00
1.12
D. Impact of System Configuration
on Software Dependability
System configuration is an issue that demonstrates the im-
portance of considering the interactions between hardware,
software, and operations. Table X shows a breakdown of the
process pairs whose failures caused the 18 observed system
failures, based on their configurability. In the table, a
"Location-free" process pair is a pair that can be placed on any
two processors in the system, independent of hardware con-
figuration. The location of a nondisk or disk I/O process pair is
determined by hardware configuration. The failure of a non-
disk I/O or location-free process pair causes a system failure,
because the process pair executes on the two processors that
execute a disk process pair. Thus, a double processor halt re-
sulting from a failure of such a nondisk I/O or location-free
process pair would cause a set of disks to become inaccessible.
TABLE X
CONFIGURAB1L1TY OF FAILED PROCESS PAIRS
THAT CAUSED SYSTEM FAILURES
Failed Process Pair #System Failures
Location-free process pair 7
Nondisk I/O process pair 5
Disk I/(3 process pair 2
Others 4
Table X shows that the number of system failures could po-
tentially be reduced by 67% (12 out of 18) by avoiding the
overlap in location between disk process pairs and the failed
nondisk I/O or location-free process pairs. This result demon-
strates the importance of considering software dependability in
the context of an overall system.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Based on field failure data collected from the Tandem
GUARDIAN operating system, this paper discussed evaluation
of the dependability of operational software. The software
faults considered are major defects that result in processor
failures and invoke backup processes to take over. The paper
categorized the underlying causes of software failures, dis-
cussed the significance of failure recurrence, and evaluated the
effectiveness of the process pair technique in tolerating soft-
ware faults. The paper built a model to describe the impact of
faults in the GUARDIAN operating system on the reliability of
an overall Tandem system. The model was used to evaluate the
significance of key factors that determine software depend-
ability and to identify areas for improvement.
An analysis of the data showed that about 77% of processor
failures that are initially considered due to software are con-
fLrmed as software problems, 13% of them are probably soft-
ware problems, and the rest are confirmed as non-software
problems. The analysis showed that hardware fault tolerance
buys SFT. Using process pairs in Tandem systems, which was
origin.ally intended for tolerating hardware faults, allows the
system to tolerate about 75% of reported software faults that
result in processor failures. The loose coupling between proc-
essors, which results in the backup execution (the processor
state and the sequence of events) being different from the
original execution, is a major reason for the measured SFT.
This shows that the checkpointing and restart technique can be
used as a low-cost SFT strategy. The results indicated that the
actual level of SFT achieved by the use of process pairs de-
pends on the degree of difference in the processing environ-
ment between the original and backup executions and on the
proportion of subtle faults in the software.
Over two-thirds (72%) of reported software failures in Tan-
dem systems are recurrences of previously reported faults. The
modeling, based on the data, showed that, in addition to reduc-
ing the number of software faults, software dependability in
Tandem systems can be enhanced by reducing the recurrence
rate and by improving the robustness of process pairs and the
system configuration. Omission of lines of source code and not
providing routines to handle rare but legitimate operational
scenarios are the most common types of software faults in the
GUARDIAN operating system. These types of faults are also
the major causes of software reliability loss. The investigation
of the impact of system configuration on software dependabil-
ity demonstrated the importance of considering software de-
pendability in the context of an overall system.
It is suggested that more measurements and analyses be
conducted in the manner proposed here so that a wide range of
information on the dependability of operational software is
available.
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